

# Toward A Holistic Psychology of Valuing

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*Recent trends in moral development theory, especially those proposed by Kohlberg, point in the direction of a holistic approach. Intuitive modes are now more appreciated, as is the perspective religious experience of a holistic developmentalism seems stretched beyond its limits. Dabrowski's theory of Stages. Because cognitive-developmentalism seems stretched beyond its limits, Dabrowski's theory of cognitive disintegration is proposed as having the potential (a) to meet the need for a holistic theory, and (b) to penetrate the sources of value objectivity.*

BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND psychology have long pursued their penchant for breaking up the human into manageable "parts." Cognition and affect form one such dichotomy, with cognitive approaches holding the high ground in the battle in recent years. Other battles rage on: personal autonomy versus moral objectivity, values clarification versus religious indoctrination, and value objectivity versus subjectivity of values. But some new trends and some changes in old positions are taking place in the field of values and moral development. These changes suggest a unified perspective that conceives the whole person as the source of value choices and moral action.

The name of Kohlberg has, for various reasons, prevailed in moral development theory and application, and with it has come a strengthening of the emphasis on cognitive development to the exclusion of other factors. Because of his stature and the influence he had, I would like to use Kohlberg's theory as a kind of springboard for launching into a study of the more holistic trends I see emerging in the area of moral development.

Kohlberg's theory has been subjected to severe criticism. Kohlberg, in response to the critics or in the process of his own scholarly and personal development, gave indications of having turned some major corners. There is promise of new directions in the cognitive developmental approach and the psychology of morals in general. That there can be two independent moralities, one of responsibility and care, and one of rules and justice (Gilligan, 1982), was given begrudging acknowledgment by Kohlberg and Candee (1984). Kohlberg reiterated his disagreement with Gilligan's proposition but continued in the following pages to describe moral judgment making in terms of "values," "conscience," "heart," and even "intuition," praising these as approaches comparable in their results to the achieve-

ments of his Stage 5 moral reasoners. At first glance, these words may seem strange on the lips of a man who championed a cognitivist approach to morality. Perhaps they will be interpreted as an adroit reaction to critics such as R.S. Peters and others who demanded a broader approach. But the roots of Kohlberg's new insights go deeper than a mere mollifying of critics. They go into a more holistic view of the human person, and ultimately into a religious perspective on moral development. This holistic view is in need of a theory of human development more comprehensive than cognitive developmentalism. That such a holistic view is attainable is the point I would like to make here.

Let us, first, go back to our springboard, Kohlberg. Kohlberg has been well received over the years by religious educators (Kohlberg, 1977) and religious scholars (Fowler, 1984). This is not only because he gave them a structure for their theories and practice, but because, at root, a more holistic and ultimately religious attitude has appeared in Kohlberg's presentation, particularly of morality at its highest levels—Stage 6 and beyond. One can say "beyond," because, even though Kohlberg did maintain for many years that Stage 6 was the highest level of moral reasoning, he postulated long ago his little-known "Stage 7." It deserves examination here as a background for understanding some current directions in cognitive developmental theory.

## Stage 7

Stage 7 dates back to publications of 1974 and 1977 and to "lecture notes" dated 1970 (Kohlberg, 1970, 1974, 1977). Kohlberg presented Stage 7 as a "metaphor" because it was not really a new stage at all. To him there was no better way of moral judging than to judge in terms of Stage 6 universal principles of justice. Stage 6 was the ultimate, following logically from the structures of the previous five stages and capping them with a kind of "ultimate" principled moral reasoning.

Perhaps the need for a Stage 7 arose partly from the description Kohlberg gave of Stage 6. Kohlberg's post-conventional man of principle did not seem like a flesh and blood kind of person. Qualities such as empathy, care, and emotional concern seemed not to mark this man because he was supposed to be preoccupied with expressing abstract "universalizable principles of justice" and not with the milk of human kindness nor, it seemed, any feeling for his fellow man. This is consistent with the cognitive framework in which Kohlberg constructed his stages, crowned with the ultimate moral reasoning of Stage 6. Kohlberg found few, if any, inhabitants of that cold, wind-swept mountain top he called Stage 6. He began, more than a decade ago, to talk about a "stage" beyond Stage 6. But Stage 7, in the hands of some who did not see it as the metaphor Kohlberg (1970) described

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it to be, treated it more like an extra stage—a hat on the head of a clown, ill-fitting, at a silly angle, and more an afterthought than part of the whole. Perhaps the mistake was to call it a "stage" when it really represented a great leap beyond Stage 6, or perhaps an alternate to Stage 6. Why then a seventh stage (even if only a metaphor), when Stage 6 thinking represented the acme of moral reasoning?

The answer is that Kohlberg hoped "to take away from stage 6 excessive demands placed on it, the demand that it provide the answer to the problems of the meaning of life" (1970, p. 3). Ultimate concerns can not be handled by reason alone. The insight of the Stage 6 thinker was to see that morality cannot be accepted simply because it is the best bargain we can strike with society to obtain the benefits of society, while protecting our own rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness. At the highest levels of moral development, one is brought face to face with the ultimate moral question: Why be moral at all? The person moves beyond the rationalism of Stage 6 morality to a range of more inclusive attitudes toward life that are not so exclusively rational—a logic of contemplation, a mystical, ultimately religious logic. Kohlberg (1970) said:

Ultimately we all know that the deepest feeling is love and the ultimate reality is life, and our problem for today is how we can love a life which makes burdensome moral demands on you, and yet does not even console us by telling us the world is moral or just. (pp. 3-4)

With the introduction of Stage 7, Kohlberg entered into two areas he had previously generally avoided in constructing his stages: affect and religion in its higher mystical sense. Kohlberg, following Piaget, had concentrated on cognitive development. He had previously shunned the indoctrination approaches so often identified with religion in its sectarian sense. With Stage 7, he still maintained that the "claims of moral action" that sectarian religions operate on are not to be confused with the "claims of contemplation" that, while not setting out clear-cut rules for the individual person to follow, do give a way of dealing with the ultimate value questions of life.

Kohlberg's Stage 7 was, of course, not something new that he alone had discovered. It was his way of coming to that transcendent dimension of persons that human wisdom had explored for centuries. Stage 7 was merely a way of presenting this transcendent, religious dimension in terms of cognitive developmental stages of moral development. It was quite a departure, and, because of the impact Kohlberg's theory has on moral and value education, it is a turning point worthy of our consideration and worthy of elaboration because of the major directions it may be taking the study of moral development and the practice of value education.

Post-conventional individuals have come to recognize and to feel the pain of suffering in oneself and others. They lament the arbitrariness of the meanings given to life by a society populated largely by conventional

thinkers who, with little taste for self-direction, look to the crowd for moral leadership, without disturbing the status quo. Conventional thinkers are satisfied with a conventional ethic. They feel that rewards are their due because they fit in so well. Post-conventional thinkers, on the other hand, cannot incorporate any ethic merely because it is generally accepted. They cannot, for example, accept the futility of seeking lasting satisfaction from conventional goals of success, and cannot experience the pain of life's tragedies sometimes caused by man's inhumanity to man without being pushed to an examination of the ultimates of their own ethic: "Why should I be moral? What reason is there to be moral?", and sometimes, "Why should I live?"

What Kohlberg describes as "Stage 7" takes the post-conventional person beyond the merely rational into the experiential, the mystical, and the religious where the whole self, feelings especially, are active in finding a will to meaning and a will to live and be moral despite the apparent meaninglessness and the immorality of existence. According to Kohlberg (1981), this is "an emotionally powerful intuitive grasp of a reality that a metaphysics can only in a limited way express conceptually" (p. 369). These are remarkable words coming from a scholar who is looked upon as one of the most cognitive of cognitivists. The fact is that they illustrate a new direction, or rather, a greater expansion away from the narrowness of cognitive developmental theory. Perhaps a brief allusion to what Kohlberg has said about the variety of ways of going about moral choosing will lead toward an appreciation of moral development and development in general as a holistic, multilevel phenomenon.

#### "B Type" Persons

Kohlberg and Candee (1984), while still rejecting Gilligan's (1982) contention that there are two independent moralities, one of responsibility and care and one of rules and justice, did allow that, under certain circumstances of moral sacrifice, "judgments of special obligation" (p. 57), that is, judgments of moral responsibility, may be made without making judgments of principles or justice. The authors then described (p. 63) a "B type" person that they discovered in their analyses of responses to dilemmas. This "B type" person (not to be confused with Kohlberg's B substage) is more oriented to fairness than to rules or pragmatics. He or she is also capable of making moral decisions that are more prescriptive, more reversible, and more universalistic than the A type.

Type B responses reflect the Stage 5 "right answers" to our dilemmas and an intuitive understanding of the core reasons for these choices . . . a type B person is someone who, intuitively or in his or her "heart" or "conscience," perceives the central values and obligations of the dilemma articulated rationally by Stage

5 and uses these intuitions to generate a judgment of responsibility or necessity in the dilemma . . . . Implied then is the "Platonic," "Kantian" or "intuitionist" view that conscience can dimly intuit rationally principled justice and act accordingly. (p. 63)

This is certainly a much broader view of the moral chooser than cognitive developmental psychology has previously permitted. An intuitive approach to moral judgment making immediately leads to a holistic concept of the person, responding to a hypothetical or real moral dilemma not with reason alone, but with the whole self, feelings included in the conscience.

Unfortunately, in an effort to find within the parameters of his cognitive theory some room for that which transcends the merely cognitive, Kohlberg again introduced a confusing label. To name this more holistic moral judgment-maker as simply "Type B" does not tell us much about what kind of a person he or she is in contrast to Type A (which presumably exists) and risks confusion with his A and B subtypes. Perhaps he has left it to others to elaborate the nature of Type B persons, thereby encouraging us to do what we are doing here: building a more holistic concept of valuing.

Is this Type B person someone very special, comparable in rarity to a Stage 5 thinker, and does this person only "dimly intuit" rationally principled justice? Kohlberg and Candee (1984) indirectly addressed these two questions when they claimed that Type B judgments are a content-related and teleological intuition of a natural hierarchy among nine universal moral norms, including the primacy of life over law, of conscience over punishment, and of promise-keeping over authority. Kohlberg and Candee maintained that:

This hierarchy is dimly perceived at the type B perspective from Stage 2 onward, but it is only at Stage 5 that the hierarchies become consensual, because only at this stage are they directly derivable from principles, the principles of justice and benevolence, which agree in providing a similar hierarchy. (p. 64)

I think this addresses the point that not all intuition is "dim." Indeed, in persons at higher levels of development, it is a "bright" way of getting at moral truth and converges with the principled reasoning of the typical Stage 5 thinker. At the other end of the developmental process, there may be Type B persons at lower levels of development who depend on an intuition that is not so bright and, consequently, less capable of taking them to moral decisions that concur with Kohlberg's high level, principled moral reasoners.

We have seen that Kohlberg, from the perspective of a cognitive developmentalist, tried to get at "something more" beyond mere reason, and discovered it in his own reflections and data. What Kohlberg described as Stage 7 takes the post-conventional person beyond the merely rational into the experiential, the mystical, and the religious, where the whole self, feelings especially, are active in finding a will to meaning and a will to live

and be moral despite the apparent meaninglessness and the immorality of existence.

Life becomes fulfilled in creative work, human love, suffering, and social reconstruction, as one realizes that life itself was never promised as a purely rational process; birth, life, and death are processes beyond reason. Salvation (in its original sense of "salus," health, and wholeness) comes only if we step back from life and see it as a whole. The mystical experience and acceptance of life that usually involves the postulation of a supernatural other—God—can be had only if we see this life whole. To see life whole is to love and accept life because it is to see ourselves as necessarily part of it. It is a matter of getting perspective on life, and that is the function of religion in its most profound sense. A holistic psychology could support religion's perspective-giving function. Psychologically, it is a matter of shifting figure and ground; instead of focusing on ourselves with the world as background, it is a perspective that focuses on the larger reality, seeing oneself in relation to it. Kohlberg (1981) said that "mystical experiences that are religiously significant are those in which the oneness of being is disclosed and the subject-object duality is overcome" (p. 369). Whatever world view you choose, included in it is an intuitive or direct grasping of the meaningfulness of life, a sense of the going-on, the process and purpose of the cosmos.

Kohlberg, as we have noted, was not the first to realize that there is a dimension in mankind beyond mere reasoning, particularly when it comes to addressing value questions of ultimate meaning in life. Nor was he the first to grasp the place in mankind's psyche of the transcendent, the religious, and the role that the experiential plays in this. In the realm of morality, he was no pioneer in seeing the expansive and guiding function of intuition. The significance of what Kohlberg has said comes from the fact that this man has had a powerful influence on the directions moral philosophy and moral education have gone in the last 20 years, and it is likely that what he and others have said recently will influence philosophy, psychology, and education for years to come. If we are truly going off in new, holistic directions, the need is to set the main themes into a developmental theory that, while supporting what has been arrived at in some-times cognitivist terms, will provide a framework even more supportive of directions these ideas might go in the future. Psychology is in need of a developmental theory that is comprehensive, holistic, and value-based if it is to aid in some way in the task of giving perspective to life—a role integral to both religion and morality.

#### POSITIVE DISINTEGRATION THEORY

Dabrowski's theory of positive disintegration speaks to the main themes we have been reviewing, and is, at least potentially, comprehensive of the

issues we are dealing with, providing a more harmonious background and philosophy than cognitive developmentalism. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) have given a thorough explication of the theory. Previous publications (Hague, 1976, 1986) have attempted overviews of positive disintegration theory with its implications for moral education. In the light of the recent new directions cognitive developmentalism seems to be taking, the main themes of positive disintegration, particularly as they apply to moral and value issues, deserve reiteration to provide a broader perspective of the potential directions moral and value development may take.

Positive disintegration is a theory of human development, broader than the narrower parameters of a moral development theory as such. This I see as a strength, because if, as I have previously maintained, we are at a major turning point in moral theory, searching for a description of the Type B person, or, better, a set of constructs that will flesh out the newer ventures of Gilligan and others into a morality of care and responsibility, we need a more comprehensive theory of human development than seems to be present in the works of either Kohlberg or Gilligan. If we are to be holistic, we need a holistic theory, one that neither emphasizes one "part" of the human person, nor one subdivision of the whole of human development. It is quite a claim to assert that any theory is "comprehensive," and it is a major task to prove that such is true. "Comprehensive," of course, cannot in this context mean "inclusive of all" but it does, in the case of Dabrowski's theory, indicate the presence and suitability of this theory to paint the dynamics of human development in broader strokes and on a larger canvas than some other theories of development, particularly of moral development.

#### *Multilevelness*

Positive disintegration theory has come to be identified with the idea that there must be some sort of disintegration before there can be growth; a certain falling apart or breakdown of lower level structures before there can be reintegration on a higher level. If this were the only idea that the theory has to offer, it certainly would not make it unique. The theory offers disintegration as a theme, but enlightens it with the concept of multilevelness. It is "multilevelness" that is perhaps the most important key to our new doorways. Dabrowski proposed a concept that includes levels of development in the traditional sense, but goes beyond mere "stage theory" to propose levels of functioning too. Piechowski (Dabrowski & Piechowski, 1977, p. 12) called multilevelness "the central concept of the theory" and indicated that with it we are using a new key or paradigm with which to approach human behavior. By indicating that the actions we perform, the attitudes we have, and the words we use to describe them have many

levels, Dabrowski opened up a new and potentially expansive way of looking at human development. Dabrowski's clinical and empirical research has led to the clarification of many levels of emotional and instinctive functions that we tend to consider as monolithic. For Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977), there are levels of "joy," "sadness," "inferiority," "the religious attitude," and, of course, morality. When anyone builds a hierarchy, he builds it upon a set of values; "higher" usually means "better," and there is a clear hierarchy of values behind Dabrowski's placing some levels above others. For example, empathy, autonomy, self-direction, and reflection are highly valued. The automatic, the unreflected, the egocentric, and the self-absorbed are all clearly held in a low place.

#### *Dynamism*

Because Dabrowski was breaking new ground with his theory, new psychological concepts had to be developed and new words coined for them; this is especially true of the "dynamisms," the intra-psychic shaping forces of development. Most powerful among these dynamisms, particularly at higher levels of development, are the "Third Factor," the "Inner Psychic Transformation," and the "Personality Ideal." Traditional developmental psychology has long recognized the interaction of heredity and environment in shaping personality. Dabrowski added the "Third Factor," which is independent from and selective of the two traditional factors. The third factor is the selective power within the individual for accepting and encouraging, or rejecting and restraining, qualities, inclinations, interests, and desires that one discovers in one's heredity or environment. Being a dynamism centered on conscious choice, it is central to valuation, and, consequently to moral choice making.

"Inner Psychic Transformation" is a power within the individual to transcend and transform either external stimuli or one's own psychological type. Again, the value-laden theme of transformation toward something "better" is at least implicit in Dabrowski's own definition of this term (Dabrowski, Kawczak, & Piechowski, 1970).

"Personality Ideal" is a value-laden image of standards against which one evaluates one's personality structure. At first only intuitively conceived in broad outline, it serves as an empirical model for shaping one's personality, becoming more and more distinct at the higher levels. Adjusting to the ideal of personality is a form of adjustment to what ought to be, that is, it involves forming a personal moral imperative founded not on social conformity nor on conformity to some tyrannical "shoulds," but upon authentic, autonomous development shaped by education, reflection, and conscious choice. These are only three of the many dynamisms Dabrowski distinguished and described. Together, operating appropriately at

various levels, they form an integrated whole, giving a broad concept of the workings of the inner psychic milieu as it moves through levels of development from the lowest level, "Primitive Integration," through stages of disintegration toward the highest (but rarely achieved) level of "Secondary Integration."

#### *Developing an Autonomous Hierarchy of Values*

In the process of using Kohlberg's ideas as a "springboard," we noted his clear preference for post-conventional thinking over conventional, the former being "higher" and "better" than the latter. From a Dabrowskian point of view, one would say that an autonomous morality is superior to a conformist, conventional ethic. Dabrowski presented a clear process for developing an autonomous hierarchy of values.

At lower levels of development, values are internalized from external sources. Acceptance of values and the stereotyped ideas that accompany them is a function of the need to conform because there is no internal structure to generate and support nonconformity. At a higher level, which Dabrowski calls "spontaneous multilevel disintegration," value issues are confronted more intensely, for it is then that "what ought to be" comes into conflict with "what is." At this level, the dynamism of "hierarchization" is especially active, and the groundwork is laid for the emergence of an autonomous hierarchy of values, limited, albeit, to an ordering of one's own individual values.

It is not until "organized multilevel disintegration" is achieved that the individual deals competently with a hierarchy of universal values. At this level, the "Third Factor," a dynamism of conscious choice, is active, distinguishing that which is lower so it can be rejected from that which is higher and thus can be sought. The third factor judges what subject-object in oneself has uncovered. Higher levels of consciousness, for example, become more valuable than a feeling of self-identity limited to one's body.

The value hierarchization theme of positive disintegration theory is one of moving away (a) from values dictated by one's own physiology or the need merely to meet social expectations to consciously and autonomously chosen values, and (b) from an unreflected "set" of values to a more complex yet better organized hierarchy of values.

#### *Summation of Positive Disintegration Theory on Values*

As one studies Dabrowski's plan of the human psyche and explores his map of human development, one can see at its higher levels the mystical,

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religious, moral individual Kohlberg was striving to describe with his "Stage 7," and the best examples of the empathic, caring, sensitive, intuitive person Gilligan seems to find in her research on moral choice. For example, Dabrowski (1977) cited the high level of development Dr. Korczak, a Polish educator, exhibited when he went into the gas chamber together with the children of his orphanage, telling them stories to save them from the fear of death.

Positive disintegration theory restores emotion to a role of equipotential collaboration with cognition in an organic concept of the human psyche. But it goes farther than merely putting "head" and "heart" in collaboration. It presents a holistic framework. It sees the psyche as developing through levels, the process of which is dependent upon the potential of the individual to exhibit "overexcitabilities" (i.e., the sensitivity of the person to the stimuli around him or her and the ability to respond in intellectual, emotional, imaginative, sensual, or psychomotor ways). This spectrum of overexcitabilities that Dabrowski proposes offers a holistic way of understanding the human person. One can be sensitive to the world and respond to it through various channels. He lists five: emotional, intellectual, imaginative, sensual, and psychomotor. Not everyone can sense or respond equally across this whole spectrum of "connectors" with the environment. There is bound to be specialization in some channels rather than in others, so that some people may be, for example, more cognitively excitable, responding to stimuli in largely intellectual terms. Presumably, the optimal condition would be that of a person with channels open, to some degree, for perception and action in all areas.

Not all human qualities are necessarily compatible. We live within limitations—sometimes the limitations of our own choices. Dabrowski's "dissipating and directing center," while choosing some pathways for the personality ideal to follow, must perforce neglect others. Dabrowski's concept of multilevelness saves us from the error of taking "whole" as "complete." Whether it is possible or indeed desirable for any human being to have *all* human qualities is highly dubious. But, in our approach to the human person, including the moral person, it is desirable for us to take a holistic view, and to see the person not as a monolith, nor as a dichotomy of our own choosing or a mere collection of traits and factors, but as a complex system of dynamisms, or forces of development. We must learn to see the person as multileveled and open to develop "up" a series of levels that we as observers have imposed for our own understanding and are based upon our own value system. What I am proposing in this article is a consciousness of complexity, not merely in seeing the person as composed of more "parts," but of multilevelness as a concept that conceives of the process of development as going through levels determined by a clear hierarchy of values, and that within concepts we can distinguish levels which in turn are determined by value hierarchies. What I am likewise

proposing is that Dabrowski has already worked out an insightful, coherent theory for such understanding, complete with a set of values, which we are free to accept or not. Right or wrong, they are at least conscious, coherent, and autonomous. Dabrowski presented the possibility of holism, and that is much more than many other narrowly conceived theories of moral development have done.

### *Intuition*

Hopefully, psychology's current interest in "intuition" and a mystical religious approach to life is likewise not a "soft" emotional reaction in place of a "hard-nosed" cognitive approach, but a holistic response including, besides emotion, imagination, sensual sensitivity, and psychomotor overexcitabilities. It is the whole person who responds intuitively, making intuition not something less than intellectual logic, but something more, something involving a whole, developed person and thus a more reliable guide to selecting values and moral judgment making. Psychology's sanction of intuition as a legitimate means of moral judging seems more acceptable in a context of the response of the whole person because cognition, far from being neglected, is aided and abetted by a whole range of human dynamics. Intuition, taken in this broader, dynamic context, is something much more than the "female" (and presumably frivolous) prerogative to which it has been traditionally reduced in some people's eyes. Perhaps the whole argument revolves around this word, "intuition," which has a long history in the philosophy of ethics, but little respect in some contemporary psychology, including the psychology of moral development. Intuition has been something too anomalous to be taken seriously by scientific psychology, and rightly so, if we take a unilevel point of view.

In his book, *After Virtue*, McIntyre (1981) lamented the fact that we live in a specifically emotivist culture that "entails the obliteration of any genuine distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations" (p. 22). McIntyre seems rightly to be attacking the "if it feels good, do it" culture. But that approach is itself a unilevel one, setting off emotivism by itself without reference to the broader range of values and relationships to which Dabrowski's theory is so sensitive. The theory of positive disintegration would underline McIntyre's contention that "the sole reality of distinctively [emotivist] moral discourse" [taken in this unilevel sense] "is the attempt of one will to align the attitudes, feelings, preferences and choices of another with its own" (p. 23). At the same time, Dabrowski would point to higher levels of emotional development where altruism, respect, and "I-thou" relationships prevail.

At Dabrowski's instigation, even though his theory makes no direct conceptual use of intuition, we must look at intuition from a multilevel view.

We can thus see intuition ranging all the way from lower level hunches based on nothing more than whim and fancy up to judgments that are made, not by the circuitous route of logic, but by the sudden and sure grasp that is the fruit of authentic subjectivity, combining intelligence, affect, imagination, the wisdom of experience, and sensitivity in a context of care and responsibility. Perhaps there are parallels between the growth of psychology toward a more holistic system of valuing and the development of the individual toward higher levels of understanding. Dabrowski and Piechowski (1977) described just such a developmental sequence by reporting these words of a research participant in the process of achieving increasing cognitive complexity:

Thinking appears to me to be one-sided; it has lost somewhere its logical certainty. I am more uncertain and more hesitant, yet at the same time, I find myself richer in my thoughts and feelings. Perhaps less of certainty in thinking and its closer interdependence with feelings are really tied together with a greater complexity and depth of thinking. (p. 150)

### *Objectivity*

But there is something more than a holistic, multilevel concept of intuition can do than merely qualify for a higher degree of respectability. Intuition can contribute to the attainment of that "holy grail" of much moral philosophy—a degree of value objectivity. With this broader, holistic view of intuition, the possibility of objective moral judgments becomes more likely, and the resolution of the subject-object duality more feasible. Lonergan, the eminent philosopher, said that "objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity" (1974, p. 214). Objectivity and subjectivity are not really poles apart, or opposites in which one is gained at the loss of the other. That precious objectivity that we seek in values is to be found not in games pretending to exclude subjectivity, but in the very encouragement and development of subjectivity to its most authentic levels. There, at the higher levels of development, the greatest possible span of individual sensitivity is in operation, uniting affect, cognition, imagination, sensory awareness, and other dimensions of the human person that provide realistic perceptions and lead to effective action across a broad range of potentialities.

Dabrowski's levels of human development take one to higher and higher levels of authenticity, and thus to higher levels of objectivity of value judgments. Included in the dynamisms operative at the higher levels of development is a dynamism he calls "subject-object in Oneself." This dynamism is a process, rare and difficult to attain, of looking at oneself as if from outside, seeing oneself as an object for examination, while experiencing the subjectivity of the other. This "standing outside oneself" that has given us the word "ecstasy" is the heart of the religious experience.

"Mystical experiences that are religiously significant are those in which the oneness of being is disclosed and the subject-object duality is overcome" (Kohlberg, 1981, p. 369).

"Role-taking" has been proposed by moral educators such as Kohlberg and McHail as a potent method of moral education. It can, however, remain at a superficial, transient level of empathy if it involves only a passing glimpse into the lot of one's fellow man. Dabrowski's dynamism of subject-object in oneself is a much more profound, lasting, holistic force and theme of one's life than is simple role playing. In the process of development, mere introspection and self-observation ("self-consciousness" in its popular sense) become enriched by a strong evaluative component, an evaluative component that depends on developing abilities to take new perspectives, particularly the perspective of putting oneself in a broader context of relationships and the attempt to deal authentically with them. Figure emerges from the ground; what is important emerges from the merely peripheral. The individual can, consequently, arrange his or her values into a hierarchy and convert them into action. What is moral becomes more evident; what must be done is done.

This is why the more fully developed person becomes a more religious person. Faith, as Tillich (1958) told us, is a "state of being ultimately concerned" (p. 1). Religion, if it is playing its real role, is a guide to what is worthy of concern. Religion is the guide to putting things, values included, into perspective. The individual who asks questions of ultimate meaning has recourse to religious experience and the "logic of contemplation." The post-conventional person at higher levels of development asks more beautiful questions, thereby opening the possibility of more beautiful answers.

### Beauty

These last words, roughly paraphrasing e.e. cummings, bring beauty into our discussion of values, and it is not a chance relationship. Alfred North Whitehead (1967), when writing about eternal objects, listed truth, beauty, adventure, art, and peace. Interestingly, "good" and "right" are not part of the list because Whitehead believed that these overworked words had become quite imprecise. Whitehead, coming from a Platonic background, saw truth, beauty, and goodness as inextricably bound up with each other. This is a shift of focus away from rational definitions and delimitations of what is good to experiences of goodness discovered in the harmony, unity, and proportion of beauty. The beauty of art and, above all, the beauty of nature, is the beauty, like religion, of one eternal system in itself, not merely one view or another of it. Beauty as a function of religious awe puts things into perspective. Whatever world view you choose, included in it is an intuitive or direct grasping of the meaningfulness of life, and a sense of

the going-on, the process, and the purpose of the cosmos. It is beauty that holds together this whole intuitive response to goodness, which is at one and the same time cognitive, emotional, imaginative, sensual, and physical. Perhaps that is why we come, at the end of a moral pilgrimage that has of necessity been a religious pilgrimage, to see it all merge together in the harmony of beauty. Having exhausted logic in the search for meaning, values, and morality, the highly developed individual in the authentic search ceases struggling to comprehend reasons, and instead prehends this beauty. In this religious, intuitive response of the whole person, a sense of perspective prevails, and one can put not only order but harmony into the values that direct one's life.

### Conclusion

These are some strong contemporary themes in philosophy of values and in the psychology of moral development that indicate a tendency to see moral judgment making in more holistic terms—terms that by their nature are indicative of a deeper, authentically religious approach to valuing. Whitehead (1967) has given us this in a broad philosophy; the current trend in psychology to acknowledge the validity of an intuitive moral response requires a comprehensive theory of development insightful enough to understand what is going on, and broad enough to encompass it. Dabrowski's positive disintegration theory, even though it may not have yet developed a full treatment of intuition, has the potential within its multilevel perspective to fill these needs, and it offers a framework for the advancement of value theory and its application in daily life.

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## Existential Confrontation and Religiosity

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*Recent research suggests that religious intrinsicness should predict a failure to confront existential problems whereas an interactional orientation should promote the opposite influence. This study, however, demonstrated that intrinsicness is associated only with traditional religious resolutions of such difficulties and that the interactional approach is essentially unrelated to confrontation with existential realities. These data therefore failed to support claims that orthodox, intrinsic individuals are rigid in their approach to the basic existential questions of life; the data also illustrated the importance of differentiating thought content from thought process in analyzing religious influences on psychological functioning.*

RESEARCH IN THE psychology of religion has been invigorated by a growing debate over the relative merits of traditional religious and more "secular" psychological values. Religious critics have argued that atheistic assumptions implicit in most contemporary psychology are insensitive to and destructive of community norms essential for optimal societal functioning (e.g., Bergin, 1980; Hatch, 1982; Vitz, 1977). Counterclaims by at least some psychologists can be illustrated by suggestions that orthodoxy is pathogenic (a) for the individual, because it promotes personal guilt and neurosis (e.g., Ellis, 1962, 1980), and (b) for society, because it fosters sexist and patriarchal attitudes (e.g., Albee, 1984).

Empirical studies should prove useful in resolving such disputes, but controversy characterizes the research literature as well. Decades of investigation have failed to produce unanimity, even when relatively sophisticated measures have been employed. Allport (1966), for example, dichotomized religious motivations into extrinsic and intrinsic orientations and identified extrinsicness as the maladjusted use of religion as a means to selfish ends. In contrast, intrinsicness theoretically represented an adaptive master motive underlying an individual's total approach to life. Although operationalization of these variables yielded support for such conceptualizations (Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985), recent work has undermined purely positive analyses of intrinsicness by interpreting evidence in terms of social desirability factors (e.g., Batson, 1976; Batson & Gray, 1981; Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978). Specifically, Batson and Ventis

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