

TADEUSZ KOBIERZYCKI



THE PHILOSOPHY OF FEELINGS IN POLAND

Contents of Article: Introduction, Emotions in the Theories of Roman Ingarden, Julian Ochorowicz, Leon Petrażycki, Władysław Witwicki, Jan Mazurkiewicz, Kazimierz Dąbrowski, Pierre Janet, William James, Conclusion, Bibliography.

INTRODUCTION

Many philosophers investigate the role of feelings in the cognition process and treat them as a correlate of content or as a formal correlate of notions or as components of a non-notional kind of cognition, as pre-reflective ways of encapsulating the world, which constitute the basis of notional cognition or are mediators between sensual cognition and mental cognition.

Three positions gave us important examples of understanding the role of feelings in human cognition – emotionalism, empathism and emotivism. The first one assumed that man's emotional life can be directly translated into cognitive or volitive activity (e.g. J. J. Rousseau, J. G. Herder, F. H. Jacobi, F. C. S. Schiller, F.E. D. Schleiermacher). The second one assumed that empathy is the foundation of emotional and moral cognition (e.g. T. Vischer, H. Lotze, E. Stein). The third one rejected the possibility of translating emotional cognition into moral cognition and assumed that it is always just a kind of a form of emotional cognition and behaviour (e.g. Ch. L. Stevenson, A. J. Ayer, M. Ossowska).

My article focuses on presenting the role of emotions in man's sensual, emotional and mental cognition from the scientific and meta-scientific perspective. An example of the first perspective is the claim stating that each living cell has a germ of feelings (e.g. of pleasure and distress), which are indicators of orientation in time and space – of the cell system, internal organs and directional dynamics, i.e. instincts, urges and the whole personality.

An example of a meta-scientific perspective is the assumption stating that feelings do not have a physical, but rather a spiritual, meta-physical, cosmic or divine character, like love, which initially only regarded the man – Spirit (God) relation (cf. Plato, St Augustine, St Thomas etc.). Such feelings would not concern all the organisms, like those that have only a vegetative or animal soul, but only those that possess the so-called thinking soul (mind, reason, intellect). In this context, feelings can be rational or irrational, etc.

In Poland, the cognitive, aesthetical, ethical and psychological functions of feelings were discussed, amongst others, by Michał Wiszniewski, Julian Ochorowicz, Leon Petrażycki, Władysław Heinrich, Kazimierz Twardowski, Władysław Witwicki, Roman Ingarden, Tadeusz Czeżowski, Stefan Błachowski, the psychiatrists Jan Mazurkiewicz, Antoni Kępiński and Kazimierz Dąbrowski etc. They underlined, above all, their behavioural, cognitive and existential meaning.

Julian Ochorowicz (1850-1917) distinguished – subject- and object- related feelings, emotions and feelings, moods and dispositions, as well as feeling sensations, impressions, compassion and premonition. He also distinguished feelings which are located and dislocated, pleasant and unpleasant, cry and laughter, chronic states etc. His main article on feelings has not been published yet and remains a manuscript, therefore it is unavailable for

more extensive reading and analysis.

This is the table of contents of the manuscript titled "The Psychology of Feelings" by Julian Ochorowicz (deciphered by Anita Benisławska, Warsaw 2010)"

Introductory Part – I. Different Forms of Feeling States – 1) Objective and subjective impressions, 2) Emotions and feelings, 3) Moods and dispositions, 4) Feeling sensation, sense of, impression, compassion and premonition; II. What distinguishes general subjective states from detailed objective states? – 1) The lack of clarity of affective phenomena, 2) The quantity oppositions of affective phenomena, 3) The Feeling is subjective, 4) A feeling has to have a location, 5) Feelings in contrast to intellectual states weaken by being accustomed to them, 6) Feelings are clearly characterised by their main intensity; III. What is the difference between introverted states of pleasure and displeasure; IV. Theories explaining the justified difference between pleasing and displeasing states – 1) Volitional theories, 2) Intellectual theories, 3) Theories of actions in general, 4) Theory of growth and loss of force, 5) Theory of usefulness, 6) Theory of nerve and molecular equilibrium, 7) Theory of contrasts, 8) Theory of harmony or disharmony between the reserves of force and their consumption; V. Criticism of the hypothesis of the connection of feelings and the metabolism; VI. Peripheral changes during feeling states; VII. The evolution of feeling expression; VIII. Crying and Laughter; IX. Chronic states – 1) a Lack, 2) Deduced changes; Part One. Subjective impressions – 1) Subjective external sensations, 2) Auditory sensations, 4) Olfactory sensations, 5) gustatory sensations, 6) tactile sensations; A. Sensations coming from mechanical external stimuli – 1) Pricking, 2) Cutting, 3) Piercing, 4) Scratching, 5) Pinching, 6) Hitting, 7) Gripping, 8) Skin tearing, 9) Peeling oneself 1), 10) Stinging, 11) Itching, 12) Tickling, 13) Tightening; B. Sound sensations at first triggered by external stimuli i.e. physical and chemical – 1) Burning, 2) Scalding, 3) Freezing, 4) Injure by frostbite, 5) Straining; C. From electric stimuli – 1) Spark stinging; D. From magnetic stimuli; E. Sensations of auditory stimuli independent of external stimuli – 1) Neuralgia, 2) Skin pain, 3) Itching, 4) Over-sensitivity; I. Pleasurable tactile sensations – 1) Touching oneself, 2) Being touched by someone else, 3) Active touching of someone else, 4) Touching nonliving objects; II. Internal sensory sensations – 1) From the muscle organ, 2) From the respiratory organ, 3) From the vocal organ.

The presented table of contents of the manuscript indicates a comprehensive approach to the issue of feelings not only in Poland, but in Europe of Julian Ochorowicz's times. A lack of a broader availability to this text condemns Poles and Europeans to a historical and cultural ignorance. It triggers a feeling of shame and guilt for the negligence of scientific institutions, academies of ministries and universities the work of great Polish scholars – not only concerning feelings. The publication of the table of contents of "The Psychology of Feelings" is an attempt to break the permanent state of ignorance in this sphere of our nation, even of those historians of science, who have written wisely on the subject of Ochorowicz and his theories.

Leon Petrażycki (1867-1931) attempted to connect the science of law and morality with emotional psychology. Firstly, he presented emotions in the psychology of cognition, concentrating on the notion of thinking and drawing conclusions. Next, he presented emotions in the psychology of feelings, discussing the notion of affects, passions and moods. He also presented the problem of emotion in the psychology and theory of instincts. (cf. L. Petrażycki, Russian Ed. 1908, Polish Ed. 1959).

Petrażycki maintained that feelings and cognition constitute a basic category of psychic

experience. His concern was about experiencing pleasure, satisfaction, delight ("positive feelings") and experiencing displeasure, discontent, suffering ("negative feelings") (cf. L. Petrażycki, 1959, p. 232).

He also analysed the notion of "emotional tone" and "cognitive-emotional complexes" that consist of cognitive and emotional elements (e.g. as sets of imaginations and pleasures, imaginations and displeasures etc.). In his view, those complexes are wrongly called "higher feelings".

Petrażycki referred to notions already functioning in psychology – affects (Affekte), moods (Stimmungen) and passions (Leidenschaften), as well as to their intensiveness and extensiveness. He made a critical review and adjusted the theories of Wilhelm Wundt, Arthur Schopenhauer, William James, Theodor Ribot etc. He carried out an interesting analysis of the relation between emotions, instincts and act of man's will.

Jan Mazurkiewicz (1871-1947) in his "physiological theory of feelings" attempted to present the physiological sources of emotions. He referred, among others, to the discoveries of Pierre Janet's and Sigmund Freud's theories of feelings. He made a critical review of the psychophysiological assumptions of the James-Lang concept of feelings. He assumed that human evolution depends on three main "regulations", "programmes", i.e. engrams. Today, we would say "drivers", which control the cognitive, emotional and behavioural processes of an organism.

Initially, the gnostic, emotional and movement engrams act without diversification. Their main aim is to realise the individual life programme of an organism. Only during development is there a division of functions, their specialization and gaining autonomy (cf. J. Mazurkiewicz, „Zarys fizjologicznej teorii uczuć”, vol.1.-1928, vol.2.-1930).

"The biological role of feeling tendency consists of a proper disposition of the body towards an impression (irritation) by the appropriate activation of the performance apparatus, and thus appears the biological necessity of emotional irradiation not in one, but in both directions" (Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 35).

The foundation of the evolution of man's mental life are instincts, also called drives (vital, sexual, gregarious i.e. syntonic, cognitive). Instinctive emotionality – is a latent mnemonic-affective orientation. It becomes active under the influence of external stimulus or stronger, energetic discharges of cortex centres, under the influence of periodical physiological needs. The syntonic drive forms man's entire emotionality, it set the direction for the cognitive and motor drive.

Species experiences are established in the subcortex nodes while the individual ones in the cortex. The complex of species engrams includes – 1) the fundamental ability to recognize shapes (global), 2) feelings directed at the object (klisis) or directed from the object (ekklisis), 3) general kinaesthesia (grasping or evasive movement). A feeling always has a negative or positive nature in various species. The emotional component revives the other components and gives them form and colour.

There are original and mnemonic feelings, i.e. feelings derived from the direct impulse of sensations or from the remembering such an impulse.

The syntonic drive develops itself during phylogenesis from the sexual and family drive (gregarious, ancestral), and not by the sublimation of the libido in individual life (cf. S. Freud). Syntony is an emotional phenomenon of co-sounding (Eugen Bleuler), which supports the building of social relations. Schizoid behaviour (psychopathy, psychosis) lacks it. Its excess in adult life means a development of an inhibition of social feelings.

In his concept, J. Mazurkiewicz attributed a huge role to organic feelings: - "the psychophysiological significance of organic feelings is incomparably bigger than the psychological one, because they are the only source of the active force of the dynamics of the whole emotional life" (J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 47). This group includes e.g. an innate impression of a filled bladder. The complex of these emotional sensations and the system of reaction to such sensations remains in its primeval form till the end of man's life.

The organic feeling which finds its reference point in the cortex, stops its previous sensations (pol. odczucia zmysłowe), which creates a conflict between the organic feelings. Victorious is the one, which is more strongly bounded with the movement system, which allows a discharge of present stress. The dysfunctions of organic feelings are responsible for emotional pathologies.

According to Jan Mazurkiewicz - "each organic sensation, of a sufficient intensity, has all the traits or dimensions of a feeling" (J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 41). In the activity of the organic feelings, as well as in that of others, an important role is played by the feelings of displeasure and pleasure.

The oldest organic sensation is pain. Not only does it deorganize the system of emotional and cognitive reactions, but it also breaks us out from the normal perception of time. Severe pain may hamper logical processes and lead to unconsciousness. (cf. J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 43). In the thirties a several dozen of kinds of pain were identified (e.g. Baunis - 83, Hahnemann - 73).

Instinctive feelings have a hereditary nature and are transferred as schemas of emotional reactions remembered by generations. They exist as stable, latent mnemonic-affective orientations, which are dynamized under the influence of specific situations and external stimuli.

Thanks to instinctive feelings, a child wakes up from time to time in order to reproduce and reactivate his time-spatial, bodily and emotional contact with its mother. It does so by satiating its physical, bodily and emotional hunger, in order to support the evolution of the higher structures of its own nervous system. The state of sleep is an extension of the foetal state. The state of vigil is aroused by instinctive mechanisms.

Jan Mazurkiewicz also distinguishes prelogical feelings that are isolated, magical and present in a child until it is seven years old (and in indigenous peoples). During adulthood they can be caused by the damage of the coordinative-hierarchical structure of the frontal lobe. Such damage destroys the control of prelogical emotions. Prelogical emotions are stimulated and appear in the production of visual symbols in the reality, similarly as in a dream. There is a lack of critical, logical control of those symbols.

Symptoms of prelogical emotions appear in individual and group psychoses (national

megalomania, fanaticism, nationalism, ideological e.g. fascism, communism, delusional tendencies, crimes etc.). Their positive meaning is observed in scientific and artistic works, when they are included in the hierarchical activity of logical functions.

Original and irradiated feelings exist that have a free and conditioned nature. Organic sensations differ from sensory sensations (original and memory based), which are combined with a gnostic component. "All sensory sensations (visual, auditory, tactile) are by nature indifferent, as opposed to original sensations and can receive an emotional evaluation (colour) by the latter directly or indirectly (J. Mazurkiewicz, vol. 2, p. 45).

The emotionally active subcortex charges transmit energy to the cortex, which produced by emotional irritations, attributing a positive (pleasurable) or negative (upsetting) tone. Conditional feelings are created at the cortex level, evoked by a phenomenon of the irradiation of the organic feeling's stress, which is included to the gnostic trait of other complex.

Thanks to emotional irradiation, it is possible to cross the level of organic and impulsive emotionality. The first emotional conditional reflex of the child is joy or sorrow at the sight of its mother. Conditional feelings remain in relation with any kind of practical activity, artistic work, science, upbringing and social behaviour, as well mental development.

Higher feelings also exist, which are the inhibitors of the instincts, and if there are no such feelings, there are no restraints as well, even if the instinct is correct. Their role consists of inhibiting the activity of instincts and correcting their emotional expression. Thanks to this, it is possible to create a world of autonomic, non-impulsive emotions, which individualize man's cognition and activities in the world.

Wladyslaw Witwicki (1878-1948) by referring amongst others to Wundt's theory, distinguished: 1) simple feelings (pleasure and displeasure), 2) emotional processes, 3) higher feelings, 4) moods (a temporary disposition to a certain type of feeling) and 5) affects – as sudden feelings – sthenic and non-sthenic, instinctive and habitual. He named all there – 6) emotional life (cf. W. Witwicki, *Psychologia*, vol. 2, 1963, p. 17).

Witwicki distinguished – instincts, feelings and affects. He described ways of "subjecting feelings" – by suggestion, imitation or by performing the symptoms. He also accepted the possibility of the irradiation of feelings, their influence on indifferent objects. He found that they influence judgements and actions, as well as evoke thinking.

Roman Ingarden (1893-1970), while referring to Robert Vischer's theory, spoke approvingly about the directness of empathy, which embraces "coexistence" (miterleben) and "co-feeling" (an, nach, zu – fühlen). It consists of inserting or placing something on the object, which happens at the moment and spontaneously. Yet, he rejected his theory of "mental infecting", reacting with joy to joy, or with sadness to sadness by means of an emotional imitation of the other person. This concept was easily accepted in psychiatry, but was questioned by philosophy.

Roman Ingarden thought that what appears here is a kind of "sensing" (Erfühlen) and reacting of the similar to the similar. Empathy is a direct experience, it shows and makes foreign mental states available, when what is empathized becomes "present" (not just thought or imagined). R. Ingarden stated that "empathizing is the direct exploratory

experience, the one that gives us knowledge, this direct identification with the other person, walking in his shoes; indirect and consequent empathizing appears when it is still needed." (Ingarden 1981, p.72)

Cognition through empathy is needed, because notional knowledge does not create a direct access to the object. This stance can be accepted not by phenomenologists, but also by psychoanalysts and existentialists.

A certain kind of cognition is based on "observation filled with emotions" or "observation infused spiritually with emotions" of objects (cf. R. Ingarden, 1981, p. 79). When the mind is able to integrate its own cognitive processes with objects that he perceives, then only emotional experiences are combined and various cognitive elements are arranged in a cognitive hierarchy.

Most phenomenologists gave a feeling a soul (in case of individual experiences) or a spirit (in case of collective experiences). Roman Ingarden thought that "sensory sensation" (Empfinden) can embrace all emotions (Pol. "wzruszenia").

Kazimierz Dąbrowski (1902-1980) was the only Polish author to connect the notions of syntony, sympathy and empathy in his own concept of the personality's evolution and development. It begins from the activation of the genetic, impulsive and emotional structure within the environment and self-activity (I). Emotions are connected with primeval reflexes of the nervous system, formed as the defence instinct. It coexists with the fight instinct (temperament syntony). In his theory, K. Dąbrowski referred to, among others, the theory of P. Janet and W. James.

Pierre Janet assumed that a feeling is a kind of inner acting, not a passive experience. He started from analysing the feeling of emptiness, i.e. the analysis of reactions evoked by the lack of feelings, pronouncing lack of the so-called derivative activities. Those activities are – the feeling of exhaustion and effort. One supports the primeval activity, another one suspends it. In sadness, there is a reaction of failure, in joy a reaction of triumph. The basic feelings are the feeling of stress and effort, idleness and discouragement, exhaustion, melancholy and sadness, rapture and joy (cf. Janet 1926 & 1928).

William James maintained that "emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable." (James 1890). According to him there is a countless number of types of emotions and their varieties, e.g. "what may be called the »coarser« emotions, grief, fear, rage, love, in which every one recognizes a strong organic reverberation, and afterwards speak of the »emotions«, or of those whose organic reverberation is less obvious and strong" – moral, intellectual, aesthetic and bodily reactions connected with them. According to James "one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between (...)." (James 1890)

According to K. Dąbrowski, primeval emotionality is integrated with the instincts, it is characterised by biological defence reactions connected with sustaining physical or mental life. Next there are dynamics of primeval affective sympathy and antipathy, which are an expression of changeable reactions, sensations and moods connected with social relations. Ambivalence and ambivalence dominate here. They are emotional insights, which are subject to permanent divisions, dispersing or concentration for the purpose of defending ego.

Feelings at this level are often contradicted and present themselves as moods, imposed by their own body sensations or environment pressure. Emotional cognition of this type has an identification and projective character – directed at the outside where it is balanced through emotional cognition of introjective character.

Projective emotional insight transforms itself into introjective insight and then into a “connective” insight, creating a type of emotional cognitive organ – an emotional subject, an emotional soul or emotional “self”, individual or group.

Impulsive-emotional or social-emotional formations can attain some sort of emotional conscience, which identifies negative and positive emotions, analyses them intellectually and debilitates their negative influence.

At this level, the Ego takes the energy of the negative and isolated emotions in order to create emotional formations of a higher level, which are, among others, love for others and oneself and friendship. Energy is taken from the cognitive and emotional acts, which are: wonder about oneself, dissatisfaction with oneself and the feeling of shame and guilt.

The critical moment is the changing of the energy of those emotions into a new structure of mental organisation, which is called by K. Dąbrowski “positive maladjustment”, which includes an intellectual, emotional and behavioural component. Its opposition are the intellectual and emotional acts of self-choice, self-affirmation and self-upbringing, thus a type of global self-cognition.

Perceiving the world and oneself by means of feeling can be – automatic, spontaneous and intentional. In the first case, it is instinctive and sensory perception, in the second one – impressionistic and emotional perception, and in the third one – imaginary and mental. All these perceptions are subject to passive or active transcendence.

Primeval emotional syntony, which has an impulsive character, is differentiated only under the influence of emotional antipathy and sympathy. The evolution of emotional insights goes from atmospheric “syntony”, through affective “sympathy”, to emotional “empathy”. Apart from those three emotional factors acting on the basis of the evolutionary model, there are many factors that integrate them or disintegrate them.

CONCLUSION

Before the Second World War, theories of William James, William McDougall, Henri Bergson, Wilhelm Wundt, Theodor Ribot, Piotr Bovet and Pierre Janet were popular in Poland. They are based on the conviction that there is a strong relation between emotions and the body, and that bodily sensations play a role in the modification of man’s emotional structures. Here are two examples:

Pierre Janet states that James’ description lacks the psychic element. Yet, he himself wanted to describe them only from the outside. Janet and James are sensitive as for the disorder that each emotion presents, so they describe this emotion as a kind of less adapted behaviour or a maladaptive behaviour or even – behaviour of failure (cf. Sartre 2002).

“Thus the physiological theory of James has led us, by its own insufficiency, to Janet’s theory of behaviour, and the latter to the theory of functional emotion in form-psychology, and this refers us finally to consciousness” (Sartre 2002, p. 28). Sartre includes to important discoveries in the process of recognizing the role of emotions, the theory of emotion-instinct,

the theory of emotion-purpose (psychoanalysis) and theory of emotion-consciousness (phenomenology).

The contemporary reflection of Polish philosophers on the issue of the role of feelings in cognition and emotion in action is quite limited. Older philosophers attempted not to separate emotional acts from sensory, intellectual and performative act analysis. Bodily impulses (pressure, impression, instinct, drive, movement) and intellectual impulses (thought, attention, observation, meditation) act and evoke emotions. These are not only sensory, but also mind reactions which form multidimensional and multileveled cognitive phenomena.

At a Philosophical Convention in Piotrawin, in the spring of 2010, a philosopher from Lublin, Stefan Symotiuk, presented a long list of questions concerning the cognitive role of feelings – 1) What are “experiences”? 2) What are “moods” – “emotions” – “passions”? 3) Is emotion a condensed, intensive atmosphere (fear, terror), is the atmosphere objectless (fear) and emotions objective (fear of the dog)? 4) Do “mixed states” concern moods individually (gloominess, longing); or moods + emotions (gloom + fear = fury)? 5) Do emotional experiences differ as far temporal direction is concerned (towards the past, present, future)? 6) Do different feelings “recognize” by heading towards objects – people – abstractions (love for nature – children – beauty)? 7) Do feelings “recognize” (can we recognize the world by regret)? 8) Is there knowledge that impairs feelings and one that enhances it? 9) What is the relation between experiences and “needs” (for security, food, community, value, creation)? 10) Are relations among emotions hierarchical or “central-peripheral”? 11) Are there contradictory experiences (either – or), or is it possible for them to “mix” together? Does “pure love”, “pure fear”, “pure hope” exist? 12) What is the difference between: the feeling of passion, the passion for something, and hope? 13) How do organised emotions (organised regret – grief, aggressiveness – war enthusiasm) exist? 14) What is the relation between emotions and: melancholic, sanguinic, choleric temperament? 15) What causes the expiration of feelings and what causes the non-expiration of feelings (eternal love)? 16) What is “emotional frigidity”? 17) Is it possible to “feel” other emotional states, or just “put oneself into their position”?

It seems as though all that is great in man goes beyond the borders of pleasure and displeasure, liking and disliking. In an act of emotional insight, man can go beyond his own existence in order to understand and to get know himself better. Senses, feelings and the mind are the sacred triad of human cognition and should be examined for the good of mankind.

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