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Positive Disintegration and the Levels of Love

John G. McGraw, Ph.D., Loyola of Montreal. a descriptive-normative investigation of the correlation of mental dynamisms with axiological phenomena. Like Max Scheler's phenomenological analysis of human emotions in relation to their hierarchical values, the author of the theory of positive disintegration "attempts to show than an objective hierarchy of values can be derived from the analysis of the mental development of man." Both authors regard values not only as embracing subjective valuations but as objective value facts. The prescriptive and descriptive orders are interpenetrable. Both writers suscribe to the phenomenological principle that intentionality regarding truth, even so called factual truth, has its source in man's prior affective attentionality to valuation. Each is reminiscent of Kierkegaard's familiar phrase that truth is subjectivity.

For Scheler the truth about subjectivity is prepotently and pre-eminently congealed and revealed through the <u>a priori</u> and irreducible emotional acts of love and hatred exhibited by a given person, group or culture. Love and hatred are unique attitudes towards objects possessing value in attending to the individual core of things. They are ontic determinants not only of all other emotions but the powers that be be behind all cognitive and volitive processes. They reveal in fundamental fashion the eternal (essential) and yet situational (existential) hierarchy of values. Love for Scheler is par excellence the synthesis of essence and existence.

For Dabrowski the truth about subjectivity constitutes a continuum from primary to secondary integration, from given individuality to acquired personality. Positive disintegration can be viewed in terms of love as involving

a movement from the selfish egocentrism of psychopathology and primary integration towards empathic alterocentrism of the personality, personality ideal and its aims. The levels of his typology correspond to the strata of hierarchized mental dynamisms objectively founded and empirically discernible which can be distinguished by love valuations and disvaluations (egocentrism). These range from negative and primitive syntony (e.g. negative adjustment), asyntony (e.g. indifference) and antisyntony (e.g. negative maladjustment) to positive and secondary syntony (e.g. positive adjustment), asyntony (e.g. positive detachment, incisive contact introversion, meditation, contemplation) and anti-syntony (e.g. positive maladjustment).

Empathic syntony, the apogee of love in his terminology, is achieved in realization of the personality ideal in secondary integration:

"On the highest level, that is to say, integration, we encounter deeper understanding of every human in respect to his developmental level, inner potential and similar functions. This expresses a form of syntony that is multi-dimensional and multilevel; it goes parallel with an increased understanding of the whole psychic structure of encountered persons. With the understanding of the deeper needs of others, with constant readiness to help, with identification with others and profound empathy, comes peace of mind. Its mark is an attitude of "syntonic" wisdom, understanding, kindness and generosity.

Love for Dabrowski culminates in a kind of intuitive understanding of the need levels of others. Understanding signifies a syntonic vision of lower and higher values ultimately viewed against the background of the other's personality ideal. Such understanding is not purely cognitive, emotive, or volitive, but contains elements of all three in hierarchical form with

emotionality architectonically and synergistically at the summit.

Syntonic wisdom empathizes with the values of others and penetrates the ideal but real potentialities of others, all others. Syntony might well be regarded as the essence of valuation according to his theory and the barometer of individuality personality. It appears to be the chief constitutive of the personality ideal, its aims, and its high level confluence of differentiation and assimilation in regard to mental synamisms.

Again the affinity between Dabrowski and Scheler 10 is striking as the following citation witnesses:

Love does not simply gape approval, so to speak, at a value lying ready to hand for inspection. It does not reach out towards given objects (or real persons) merely on account of the positive values inherent in them, and already given prior to the coming of love. For this idea still betrays that gaping at mere empirical fact, which is so utterly uncongenial to love. Of course there is an awareness, in love, of the positive value of the things loved, for instance, the beauty, the chairm, and the goodness of a person, but we can be aware of this without any love at all. Love only occurs when, upon the values already acknowledged as 'real' there supervenes a movement, an intention, towards potential values still higher than those already given and presented. These additional values are not yet manifested as positive qualities, being merely envisaged concurrently as potential ingredients of a corporate structural pattern. In so doing love invariably sets up, as it were, an 'idealized' paradigm of value for the person actually present, albeit conceiving this at the same time as an embodiment of his 'true nature' and real value which only awaits confirmation in feeling. To be sure this 'paradigm' is implicit in the values already disclosed empirically in feeling and only the fact that it is so implicit keeps it free from interpolation, empathetic projection, etc., and hence from delusion. But, for all that, it is not empirically latent in them, save as an appointed goal,

an objective ideal challenge to a better and more beautiful fulfillment of the whole.

Both and Scheler reject the Platonic notion that love is directed towards an ideal as such, even the ideal of love. Love is for the real concrete person as the possessor of actual and potential values.

Moreover love is not a projection of our self upon the other as Theodor Reik has so lucidly described in early romantic love, wherein love (if requited) is the interchanging of ego-ideals resting upon a <u>dissatisfaction</u> with oneself relevant to that described by Dabrowski has an early form of the dynamisms of valuation. It contains a strong emotional component and disapproval of some of the elements of one's own mental structure. 12

Why do I discuss at such length the creation of the egoideal? Because two separate lines lead from this phantom directly to the heart of our problem. The first gives the cause for the discord or the displeasure... runs unconsciously ahead of love. In all cases the discontent is in the nature of disaffection with oneself. We are now able to say that it is founded on the awareness that we fall far short of our ego ideal, far below our unfulfilled wishes.

The mood that results from this disappointment - if it is not too desperate - disposes one, more than anything else to fall in love. Love is a substitute for another desire, for the struggle toward self-fulfillment, for the vain urge to reach one's ego-ideal.

The non-realization of this drive makes love possible, but it also makes it necessary, because the tension within the ego increases. The fulfillment of the ego ideal would make one self-satisfied and self-sufficient and would remove the internal distress... Thus love is really a second-best, a compensatory way for not obtaining the ego-ideal state. Yet it is not self-love, as the theory of narcissism maintains. As a matter of fact it is nearer to self hate...

From this concept it is obvious that love itself is only possible after a certain phase in the development of the personality has been reached. The creation of the ego ideal itself marks human progress. When people are entirely satisfied with their actual selves, love is impossible.

The transfer of the ego-ideal to a person is the most characteristic trait of love. The development thus starts as a striving after self-perfection, which is frustrated.<sup>13</sup>

If the person is utterly despondent and dissatisfied with self to the point of self-hatred love of others is hardly possible if one subscribes to the kind of self-hatred as delineated for example by Scheler, Erich Fromm, Karen Horney. Nor of course would one love others if one adheres to Plato's position that perfect beings, the gods, do not love because they are completely self-satisfied. What Reik describes above also is similar to Dabrowski's concept of inferiority towards oneself. The psychopath could never love in the manner of which Reik writes since according to Dabrowski, he never has inferiority feelings towards himself and does not experience internal conflicts due to his selfish self-complacency. <sup>1h</sup> Reik notes how irritating yet exciting, annoying yet alluring this love is. <sup>15</sup> Much of what he details seems to pertain to unilevel disintegration with its characteristic "ambivalences and ambitendencies and multiplicity of wills. <sup>16</sup>

There is obviously considerable egocentricity in a love relationship if what is loved is but one's ego-projection and which

starts from dissatisfaction with oneself, astonishment about the object, admiration and envy, hostility, all of which then lead to the powerful reaction formation of love, which in turn is followed by the countermovement retracing the same path in the opposite direction. 17

Nevertheless Reik asserts that romantic love however may be transformed into genuine love since it is not necessary to idealize or idealize the beloved. 18 But this transformation for Dambrowski would require I think the dynamisms

of directed multilevel disintegration. Romantic love 19 is often undoubtedly both a cause and an effect of neurotic and psychoneurotic dynamisms to which the bewildering array of love literature, music, films, and other media will attest. Love, particularly first sexual (not necessarily genital) - erotic - romantic love, is usually the first momentous intersubjective challenge to the individual. Perhaps its being caricatured as temporary madness conceals the truth of its positive and psychoneurotic qualities. Romantic love seems to outsiders to be emotionally immature.

One of the reasons for this is that regression if possible entails the simplicity spontaneity, playfulness, and direct pleasure of the child and my preserve a love relationship in an environment which is or seems dedicated to complexity, work-discipline, ethic low level seriousness, and boredom. A deeper reason, however, lies in the fact that autonomous love relationships are a synthesis of spontaneity (becoming) and discipline (being) in the temporalities of past, present and future.

Regression, Presence (spatial and temporal) and Progression fuse insofar as lovers seek an "eternal now". Love in highly developed people includes both positive constancy and change, especially multi-level self-change. These polarities are friends rather than enemies in organized multi-level disintegration and secondary integration. The transition from spontaneous to organized multi-level disintegration is itself the higher synthesis of of unity becoming with being, spontaneity with order, diversity with enriched unity. 20

Hence in loving a person it is not the canonization and subsequent idolatry of a projected ideal self or the introjected ideal model which is thereupon projected.

Love is that movement wherein every concrete individual object that possesses value achieves the highest value compatible with its nature and ideal vocation; or wherein it attains the ideal state of value intrinsic to its nature. (Hatred, on the other hand is a movement in the opposite direction).21

Hatred both destroys higher values and blinds our vision to the actuality and possibility of values.<sup>22</sup> For Dabrowski hatred is non-operative at the highest level syntony; but while it excludes hatred it can include "disapproval of some...attitudes and acts."<sup>23</sup> It is the primitively organized man, especially the psycopath, who pulls down others values and overestimates his own.<sup>24</sup>

Alterocentrism is classified positively on three levels: syntony, identification, and empathy which represent progressively ascending gradations of value perception varying essentially according to the refinement of the inner psychic milieu. Egocentric syntony and identification found at lower levels of disintegration are predominantly reflexive, partially automatic and superficial. 26

Egocentric syntony resembles Scheler's emotional infection which can be detected as anything from innocuous contagious laughter to mass frenzied excitement. 27 Egocentric undifferentiating identification as defined by Dabrowski has a Schelerian counterpart in the latter's emotional unity or identification. According to Scheler such involuntary identification occurs when one either absorbs or eclipses otherness (ideopathic identification) or is absorbed by it (heteropathic.) Instances of these are abundantly observable in primitive consciousness, hypnotism, the mob's absorption into

into the "Leader", masochism and sadism, children's behaviour, the maternal instinct and in general in forms of absolute collective existence. 28

Love literature abounds with words such as merge, fusion, identification, union, communion, identity, partnership and shaaing. Emotive, Cognitive,

Volitive love unions are not of course entitative unions unless one is a monist.

Though syntony "is an ability to feel something in common with others, to understand them, and to be willing to help", whatever identification and empathy with others is attained the more the lover and beloved are respected as unique, and independent. One does not abdicate personal identity in positive syntony, poetic license notwithstanding.

Love, loving and being loved, does create union but not one in which either or both is annihilated. Karl Rahner writes "Love at the same time united and distinguishes, both in the highest degree. In the relationship of personal love, union and distinction are not opposites but correlates which increase together." Egocentricity on the other hand is the subtle or overt nemesis of plurality and diversity, whereas alterocentrism unifies in diversity and diversifies in unity. Teilhard de Chardin expresses a similar notion

The coming together of the separate elements does nothing to eliminate their differences. On the contrary it exalts them.... True union does not confound; it differentiates.31

Psychopathically integrated individuals are prone to destroy otherness, ignore it (detached indifference), absorb it or be absorbed by it, him or her.<sup>32</sup> They cannot tolerate diversity in any type of union much less affirm or confirm of the other's independence. In secondary integration the union is one of <u>interindependent</u> persons who promote and preserve mutual autonomy,

authenticity and the personality ideal. Positive identification through communion or community always carries the stipulation that personal independence is safeguarded. As Dabrowski states:

The capacity for identification is obtainable only at a high level of universal mental development through the process of positive disintegration. Self-conscious and authentic identification is possible only on the foundation of a rich inner psychic milieu. It is preceded by and associated with such dynamisms as "subject-object" in oneself, the third factor and inner psychic transformation. 33

Although closely associated, identification and empathy are distince. The distinction lies in the fact that identification is more intellectual than empathy. Since empathy has an intuitive aspect about it it seems to be similar to Scheler's emotional understanding and Pascal's logic of the heart. Empathy has a distinct vision into the value (especially the moral needs of the other. 34 Moreover

Identification with others expresses the attitude of 'Klisis', (attraction) independently of the development level of the people towards whom this attitude is directed.

Identification with oneself expresses the attitude of 'Klisis' in relation to one's higher levels and 'ekklisis' (repulsion) in relation to lower levels.35

Identification with others independently of their development level is essentially the reason why it is a form of alterocentrism. It does not imply a total rejection or even hatred of self, as the pseudo love of certain forms of altruism.

I am inclined to agree with Erich Fromm when he writes

Love for others and love for ourselves are not alternatives. Neither are hate for others and hate for ourselves alternatives. On the contrary an attitude of love for themselves will be found in those who are at least capable of loving others. Hatred against oneself is inseparable from hatred against others, even if on the surface the opposite seems to be the case. In other words, love and hatred, are indivisible as far as the difference between objects and one's own self is concerned. 136

Although Dabrowski does not distinguish love and hatred as such into love of self and love of others and hatred of self and hatred of others, the entire ontogenetic process of positive disintegration and in particular the dynamisms of disquietude and discontent with oneself, dissatisfaction with oneself, guilt, inferiority towards oneself, positive conflicts, and shame reveals phenomena approaching self-hatred. Ambivalence and ambitendency in the disequilibrium of syntonic attitudes has already been noted in regard to romantic love. Moreover the dynamis of ekkeisis as repulsion would suggest self-hatred.

Dabrowski might agree with Fromm that self-hatred and hatred for others are correlatives on lower levels of disintegration and possibly higher. For one who has achieved personality it appears that hatred, certainly negative hatred, no longer functions at least as a characterological trait. Because self-realization and self-perfection in the attainment of the personality ideal involve "an authentic painful process of inner psychic transformation", <sup>37</sup> there is no change possible in his central qualities. <sup>38</sup> Moreover if this is the case then ekklisis no longer is operative in secondary integration.

Dabrowski also equates selfishness with egocentrism and empathy, the highest form of love, with alterocentrism. His terminology is less than

felicitous in my opinion but the concepts may not be essentially in opposition to those of Cowburn<sup>39</sup>, Fromm, 40 Maslow<sup>41</sup> and Scheler, 42 all of whom would not equate self-love with selfishness and egocentricity or love of others with alterocentrism. It should be clear from the notions of self-perfection and the personality ideal that Dabrowski does not equate alterocentrism with selflessness or altruism. Morever, he writes

"Authentic love of mankind, empathy toward and responsibility for all people cannot occur before the growth of deep and exclusive emotional bonds with family, friends, small communities, profession and nation." 43

If this is so then self-love would be rightfully ontogenetically first. Additionally ego-centricity can suggest an ego undifferentiated with a primitive rigid center. However, the term also suggests that unity in continuity of the self which becomes what (or better who) it ideally yet really is.

Likewise alterocentrism can either be understood as relatedness to the other in his totality out of care, responsibility and respect for him him (as a Thou according to Kierkegaard and Martin Buber) or on the contrary out of self-alienation, self-contempt, and self-hatred. Love terminology is ordinarily popularly and professionally extremely ambiguous. One reason for this lies in the fact that love is the paradigm of the paradoxical. Linguistic and mental confusion emanates from the very ontological structure of man in his being in a state of ambiguity. Interpersonal relationships and disrelationships are essentially normative relationships and love is the central determinant process. Dabrowski implies the same.

In fact the paradox is initially confronted and partially resolved in the process of disintegration culminating in secondary integration wherein the dichotomies (as for Maslow in the process of self-actualization) of self and other are overcome (insofar as this is humanly possible and problematical as contrasted with the mysterious in Marcel's reading of man). Egocentrism and alterocentrism, pride and humility, simplicity and complexity must be judged on the various. levels of mental development. Dabrowski offers in his concept of syntonic wisdom a resolution of these paradoxes in that love is the disposing and coordinating centre in conjunction with the ideal personality wherein syntony (the one) exercises synthetic (architectonic or sapiental) activity and control over all (the many) human actions.

Egocentrism and alterocentrism both point to the same perennial problem which the theory of positive disintegration confronts what is human personality and the spheres of psychological-value existence - prior to obtaining it. Neurosis and psychoneurosis are generally viewed according to this theory not as mental illness but usually represent a phase of positive, accelerated and healthy development... They are symptomatic of the recognition that man is separate and alone yet hungers for community. The primitively integrated individual is not existentally aware of this problem. The secondary integrated has largely solved it and done so through autonomous and authentic love. Psychoneurosis and neurosis may be regarded as temporary or permanent solutions to the problem of separation and communion.

## As Erich Fromm writes:

This awareness of himself as a separate entity, the awareness of his own short life span, of the fact that without his will he is born and against his will he dies, that he will die before those whom he loves, or they before him, the awareness of his aloneness and separateness, of his helplessness before the forces of nature and society, all this makes his separate, disunited existence an unbearable prison ...

The experience of separateness arouses anxiety, it is indeed the source of all anxiety... The awareness of human separation, without reunion by love - is the source of shame. It is at the same time the source of guilt and anxiety.

The deepest need of man, then is the need to overcome his separateness, to leave the prison of his aloneness...

Man - of all ages and all cultures - is confronted with the solution of one and the same question: the question of how to overcome separateness, how to achieve union, how to transcend one's own individual life and find at - onement.

The answer to the question for Fromm is mature love, that is, "the union under the condition of preserving one's integrity, one's individuality." The disintegrations and reintegrations between primary and secondary integration are types of awarenesses and answers to the anguishing dilemma of separation and union since the self in posing the problem and attending to possible answers is already differentiating and disintegrating.

For Sartre there is keen realization of problem. "Conflict is the original meaning of being - for - others." The Sartrean store can represent either the pathologizing of epistemology or the beginning of disintegration. Unfortunately the agony has no solution

"The problem of being-for-others remains therefore without solution. The lovers remain each one for himself in a total subjectivity; nothing comes to relieve them of their duty to make themselves exist each one for himself."

Man is condemned to be free but concomitantly doomed to an existence without loving or being loved since "to love is in essence the project of making oneself to be loved." Love, loving or being loved, is par excellence alienated freedom. The alienation is due to the fact that "each of the lovers is entirely the captive of the Other inasmuch as each wishes to make himself loved by the Other to the exclusion of anyone else." The lover wants to be the absolute field and foundation of all values — another variation on man's futile wish to be God for Sartre.

This of course to many appears to be unparalleled grandiose egotism buttressed by a morose if not morbid fascination the folly, illusions and delusions of what is praised as man's greatest quality, namely, human love.

Karen Horney defines and divides neurosis according to its attitudes towards love. Compulsive, imaginary infinite self-idealization with its insatiable search for glory and need for perfection is the main neurotic dynamism. The quest for human love in each kind of neurotic takes various forms but in all of them hatred by the ideal self for both the empirical (actual) and real (potential) self is the central conflict. 52

Common to both Sartre and Horney's neurotics is the wish for perfection, a perfect love, the desire to be unlimited absolute. For both the Sartrean being for itself and Horney's neurotic there is the unsatiable project to be loved.

The theory of positive disintegration would in the main regard these commonly regarded "deviations" as potential developmental tendencies towards positive syntony. A theory of psychology, psychiatry, and psycotherapy must include a theory of anxiety, separation, disintegration to be authentic. As Paul Tillich remarks

"it is necessary for an antology of courage to include an ontology of anxiety, for they are interdependent. And it is conceivable that in light of an ontology of courage some fundamental aspects of anxiety may become visible."53

The theory of positive disintegration maintains that the anxiousness of human separation borne and nurtured in the fragmentation of primitive integration is a distinct accomplishment in the process towards personality. If Sartre is pessimism personified and Maslow<sup>514</sup> overly optimistic perhaps the theory of positive disintegration provides a realistic conceptual framework, methodology and body of insights sufficiently cognizant of both man's misery and majesty to use Sartre to achieve Maslow.<sup>514</sup>

In conclusion it is my estimation that the theory is a courageous and creative effort to understand contemporary man both in his anxious separation and his disintegration towards unity and community of personality.

## References

- 1. Kazimierz Dabrowski with Andrzej Kawczak and Michael Piechowski, Mental Growth Through Positive Disintegration. The University of Alberta: Edmonton, 1969, p. 123.
- 2. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 124.
- 3. Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, Trans. by Peter Heath. Routledge and Kegan Paul, Ltd: London, 1954, pp. 148-149.
- 4. Cf. the axiological implications of the theory, op. cit., pp. 163-172. Scheler distinguishes love and hatred by means of a three dimensional classification into their forms, modes, and kinds: "Corresponding to the basic division of all acts into vital acts of the body, purely mental acts of the self, and spiritual acts of the person we also find love and hatred existing in three forms...From these 'forms' of love, let us now distinguish its 'kinds'. They relate to those differences which make themselves felt to us as particular qualities of the emotion itself, without needing to consider the various objects, or common characteristics of these, to which such emotions refer. Thus we maintain that e.g. maternal love and filial love, the love of home and country, and love in the implied sense of 'sexual love', are already distinct from one another as actual emotions, and not merely by the fact of being exercised in different fields, like a love for art, for the state, etc....Lastly we distinguish the kinds of love from the mere modes thereof, which consist in nothing more than in the conjunctions of acts of love, notably with social dispositions and feelings of sympathy. These too have left their mark on language in such expressions as 'kindness', 'goodwill,' 'liking', 'fondness,' grace and favour,' 'amiability'..., 'affection,' 'courtesy', friendliness,' 'devotion,' 'attachment,' 'loyalty,' 'intimacy,' 'gratitude,' filial regard, and so on. Op cit, pp. 169-174.
- 5. Self love and self hatred will be considered below in relationship to disquietude with oneself, inferiority towards oneself, dissatisfaction with oneself, subject-object in oneself, self perfection, and Klisis and ekklisis.
- 6. Op cit., p. 127.
- 7. R.D. Laing in his <u>Divided Self</u>, Penguin Books: Middlesex, 1967, p. 34, employs "understanding" in a manner roughly equivalent to the manner in which it is used by Dabrowski.
- 8. Empathy according to Scheler is not intuition; the latter is the sole authentic source of knowing and loving others. Correspondingly he rejects sympathy as the origin of love of others. Cf. op. cit., pp. 8-12.

- 9. Dabrowski's theory is psychologically and axiologically elitist as to the gradations of love (dependent upon the richness of the three factors). It is democratic or humanitarian in that love ought to be directed at all. In the latter respect it differs from classical philosophies of love such as found in Plato and Aristotle as well as from moderns such as Nietzsche and Ayn Rand. All four of the latter are moreover elitist as the hierarchy of love and the number and type of persons capable of attaining its summit as is Dabrowski, but they are also aristocratic as to the object of love.
- 10. I shall not dwell on the dissimilarities between Dabrowski (and his collaborators) and others referred to within this paper. As might be expected there are indeed profound differences between Dabrowski and Scheler but these differences in my estimation are themselves rooted in profound insights and are also due to varying avenues of approach and historical perspectives.
- 11. Max Scheler, op. cit., pp. 153-154.
- 12. Kazimierz Dabrowski et alii, op. cit., p. 224.
- 13. Theodor Reik, Of Love and Lust: On the Psychoanalysis of Romantic and Sexual Emotions. Farrar, Straus and Giroux: New York, 1967, pp. 35-37.
- 14. Kazimierz Dabrowski, "Psycopathy and Personality", Introduction, pp. 1-3.
- 15. Theodor Reik, op. cit., pp. 38-54.
- 16. Kazimierz Dabrowski, et alii, op. cit.
- 17. Theodor Reik, op. cit., p. 80.
- 18. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 81. Cf. Max Scheler, op. cit, pp. 159-161.
- 19. There are perhaps two dozen theories of love each with its own species. Such is the case of with romantic love; one of its species is called "Dark Passion" or "Passion of the Night". Its trademarks are violent enrapture, fatalistism, irresponsibility, enjoyment of passion as bittersweet, pseudo-mysticism, day-dream sensuality, idealization of love, love madness, incompatibility of love with marriage, sexuality, and children, and a rendevous with death. Cf. John Cowburn, The Person And Love. Alba House: Norwich, England, 1967, pp. 222-233 and Denis de Rougemont, Passion and Society. Trans. by Montgomery Belgion. Revised and augmented edition. London: Faber and Faber, 1956, French edition: L'amour et l'occident. Paris: Plon 1956. What these authors detail are loves arising clearly from negative maladjustment. Likewise the negative revolutionary (rebel) whose hatred of self corresponds to his hatred of society is often of a primitively organized bent as distinguished from the genuine revolutionary who is of a higher type manifesting positive maladjustment, and who loves concrete persons. The rebel often "loves"

others in the abstract, or "loves" some ideology, or ideal to which he is all too willing to sacrifice real persons. Scheler provides a profound scrutiny of the rebel in his account of resentiment. Cf. Max Scheler, Ressentiment. Trans. by William W. Holdheim. The Free Press of Glencoe: New York, 1961. So-called "hippy-love" is a phenomenon of great complexity in my estimation containing elements both primitive organization and multi-level (spontaneous for the most part) disintegration. Much of the Western world particularly the more affluent nations, seems to be in a process of spontaneous multi-level disintegration. To obtain organized multi-level disintegration fundamental alterations must eventually occur in the socio-political order: the most important being the establishment of a world federation of socialistic nations. Prior to this alteration is a required, however, an axiological transformation involving the demise of negative nationalism, scientism, and positivism.

- 20. Certainly one of the classic studies of such love relationships is Abraham Maslow's "Love in Self-Actualizing People," Motivation and Personality. Harper and Brothers: New York, 1954, pp. 235-260.
- 21. Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, p. 161.
- 22. Ibid, p. 154.
- 23. Kazimierz Dabrowski, et alii, op. cit., p. 239.
- 24. <u>Ibid</u>.,p. 214, no. 66.
- 25. <u>Ibid.</u>, n. 94.
- 26. <u>Ibid</u>., p. 95.
- 27. Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, pp. 14-18.
- 28. <u>Tbid</u>., pp. 18-36.
- 29. Kazimierz Dabrowski, et alii, op. cit., p. 94.
- 30. Karl Rahner, De Gratia. (Roneced Codex). Third Edition. Innsbruck, 1961, p. 196 (as cited and translated by John Cowburn, op. cit., p. 127).
- 31. Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man. Trans. by Norman Denny. London: Collins, 1964, p. 53.
- 32. Kazimierz Dabrowski, et alii, op. cit., p. 226.
- 33. <u>Ibid</u>, p. 225. Cf. Erich Fromm, "Selfishness and Self-Love" <u>Psychiatry</u>, II, November 1939, No. 4, pp. 518-520.

- Ibid., p. 225. Victor Frankl in his Man's Search For Meaning:
  An Introduction To Logotherapy. Washington Square Press, Inc:
  New York, 1968, pp. 176-177, states "Love is the only way to
  grasp another human being in the innermost core of his personality. No one can become fully aware of the very essence of
  another human being unless he loves him. By the spiritual act
  of love he is enabled to see the essential traits and features
  in the beloved person; and even more, he sees that which is
  potential in him, that which is not yet actualized but yet ought
  to be actualized. Furthermore, by his love, the loving person
  enables the beloved person to actualize these potentialities.
  By making him aware of what he can be and of what he should
  become, he makes these potentialities come true."
- 35. Kazimierz Dabrowski et alii, op. cit., p. 225.
- 36. Erich Fromm, "Selfishness and Self-Love". Psychiatry, II, November 1939, no. 4, p. 513.
- 37. Kazimierz Dabrowski et alii, op. cit., p. 234.
- 38. <u>Ibid</u>.
- 39. John Cowburn, op. cit, pp. 53-71.
- 40. Erich Fromm, <u>loc. cit.</u>, pp. 507-523.
- 41. Cf. Abraham Maslow's notions of self-respect, self-esteem, as enuntiated in Toward A Psychology of Being, 2nd edition. Van Nostrand Reinhold Company; New York, 1968, pp. 41-43, 55, 57-59.
- 42. Max Scheler, op. cit., p. 152.
- 43. Kazimierz Dabrowski et alii, op.cit., p. 215.
- 44. Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving. Harper and Row: New York, 1963, pp. 21-26.
- 45. Kazimierz Dabrowski, et alii, op. cit., pp. 158-159.
- 46. Erich Fromm, op. cit, pp. 6-8.
- 47. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 17.
- 48. Jean-Paul Sartre, <u>Being and Nothingness</u>, Part III, Chapter Three, Section I Trans. by Hazel Barnes, Philosophical Library, Inc: New York, 1956, p. 364.
- 49. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 376.
- 50. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 375.

- 51. <u>Ibid.</u>, p. 375.
- 52. Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, Routledge and Kegan Paul: London, 1951, pp. 13-63.
- 53. Paul Tillich, The Courage To Be. Yale University Press: New Haven, 1967, p. 35. Cf. R.D. Laing, op. cit., pp. 39-61, 93, and his concept of ontological insecurity. Dabrowski and Laing have somewhat of a common heritage and approach. Laing in my judgment recognizes the necessity of the "fusion" of lower and higher levels (in his discussion of embodied and unembodied self) whereas Dabrowski tends toward too great of a distinction between the two. Maslow's ordering and interrelationships of lower and higher needs I also find more acceptable than Dabrowski's, (Laing's and Maslow's elaboration on the role of love in psychotherapy, autopsychotherapy, and evaluation is also significant contribution to theories of love and man).
- 54. Abraham Maslow, op. cit. Preface to the Second Edition, pp. iii-v.